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Abstract: We welfare rank different types of second-best environmental policy. The 
focus is on the roles of uncertainty and public finance. The setup is the basic 
stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the assumptions that pollution 
occurs as a by-product of output produced and environmental quality is treated as a 
public good. To compare different policy regimes, we compute the welfare-
maximizing value of the second-best policy instrument in each regime. In all cases 
studied, pollution permits are the worst recipe, even when their revenues are used to 
finance public abatement. When the main source of uncertainty is economic, the best 
recipe is to levy taxes (on pollution or output) and use the collected tax revenues to 
finance public abatement. However, when environmental uncertainty is the dominant 
source of extrinsic uncertainty, Kyoto-like rules for emissions, being combined with 
tax-financed public abatement, are better than taxes. Finally, comparing pollution and 
output taxes, the latter are better.    
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1.  Introduction   
 
Environmental degradation caused by human activities is a main concern worldwide. 
When economic agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on the 
environment, there is need for government intervention to enact appropriate policies 
that deal with the negative externalities of pollution emissions. Policy intervention can 
take many forms. It is thus useful to be able to rank alternative environmental policies 
according to certain criteria, so that the society can choose the best one (in dynamic 
models, see e.g. Stokey, 1988, and Jones and Manuelli, 2001).    
  Examples of environmental policy instruments include taxes, permits (also 
known as cap-and-trade policy) and numerical targets for cutting emissions (also 
known as command-and-control policy). All of them are distorting and thus second-
best. In the case of taxes, for instance, taxes on pollution itself or on pollution-
generating output, the government raises the price of economic activities. In the case 
of permits, the government creates a market for pollution, by issuing a number of 
permits, and firms pollute as much as they wish only to the extent that they pay the 
price. In the case of numerical targets, the government sets an emission standard 
directly so that firms have to restrict their production accordingly and/or make 
particular technology and fuel choices. Although this list is not exhaustive,
1 there has 
always been a lot of interest in the relative desirability of these three policy 
instruments, in terms of economic performance, environmental quality and social 
welfare (see e.g. Stokey, 1998, section 6).    
  Two issues are particularly important to the debate on the choice of the 
appropriate policy instrument. The first issue has to do with the size and source of 
uncertainty. In assessing the risks from climate change and the costs of averting it, 
there is a variety of uncertainties that contribute to big differences of opinion as to 
how, and how much, to limit emissions (on uncertainty and the environment, see e.g. 
the Congressional Budget Office paper prepared for the Congress of the US, 2005). 
The second issue refers to the public finance requirements of environmental 
protection. It is recognized that the more ambitious is the environmental policy, the 
                                                            
1 For other policy instruments, see e.g. Goulder et al. (1999) and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002). 2 
 
higher the finance requirements for adaptation and mitigation actions,
2 and public 
finance should play a key role in meeting these requirements (on finance and the 
environment, see e.g. the Communication from the European Commission, 2009).
3 
  In this paper, we study the roles of uncertainty and public finance in the 
welfare ranking of different types of environmental policy in a micro-founded 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Motivated by the above, we focus on 
the following policy regimes: We first model the case in which the government levies 
taxes either on pollution itself or on output, and uses the collected tax revenues to 
finance public abatement activities. Second, we study the case in which public 
abatement activities are financed by the sale of auctioned pollution permits. Third, we 
study the case in which environmental policy takes the form of binding numerical rules 
à la Kyoto, which specify the speed to a long-term pollution target over time.
4 
  Our setup is a basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the 
assumptions that pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced and 
environmental quality has a public good character. Within this setup, there is reason 
for policy intervention. There are two exogenous stochastic processes that create 
uncertainty about future outcomes and drive the stochastic dynamics of the model. The 
first is uncertainty about production technology (standard shocks to total factor 
productivity) and the second arises from uncertainty about the impact of economic 
activity on the environment.
5 Loosely speaking, we call the former shock “economic” 
and the latter “environmental”.   
We study the implications of the above policy regimes (taxes, permits and 
rules) for macroeconomic outcomes, environmental quality and, ultimately, social 
welfare. The latter is defined as the conditional expectation of the discounted sum of 
household’s lifetime utility. Since the equilibrium solution in each regime depends on 
                                                            
2 According to the European Commission’s estimates, finance requirements could reach 100 billion 
euros per year by 2020 in developing countries only (see the Communication from the European 
Commission, 2009). 
3 Governments undertake a lot of environmental protection activities (known as public abatement). 
Examples include policies that protect, conserve and generate (via innovation) the natural resources, as 
well as policies that provide the right environmental incentives. All these are costly activities that 
require public funds. Actually, the proportion of public expenditure in total expenditure on abatement 
is high in most countries (see e.g. Hatzipanayotou et al., 2003, and Haibara, 2009). 
4 An example is the reduction of emissions by 25-40% compared to 1990 levels by 2020. Such rules 
were a key part of the Kyoto protocol designed in 1997 and continue to be a debated issue (see the 
Copenhagen UN Conference in December 2009). 
5 Future trends in emissions are uncertain depending on the pace of economic growth, the demand for 
fossil fuel, the development of technologies, etc (see e.g. the Congressional Budget Office paper prepared 
for the Congress of the US, 2005). 3 
 
the values of the second-best policy instruments employed, we welfare rank the 
alternative policy regimes when the policy instruments under each regime take their 
welfare-maximizing values. We focus on flat over time policy instruments (see also 
e.g. Stokey and Rebelo, 1995). To solve the model and compute the associated 
welfare under each policy regime, we approximate both the equilibrium solution and 
the welfare criterion to second-order around their non-stochastic long-run; in 
particular, we use the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).   
  Our results are as follows. First, public abatement activities constitute an 
important part of environmental policy. Policies that yield no pollution revenues, and 
do not allow for public abatement, suffer a disadvantage relative to revenue-yielding 
policies like taxes and auctioned permits.
6 In our setting, without being combined 
with public abatement policy, pure Kyoto-like rules cannot be comparable to taxes 
and permits and, at least for a wide range of parameter values, such rules are clearly 
inferior to taxes and permits. Hence, to make the comparison of alternative regimes 
meaningful when we move to a stochastic setup, instead of studying pure rules, we 
study mixed rules which combine (in the long run only) rules with public abatement 
policy financed by, say, output taxes. Now, when second-best policy instruments take 
their welfare-maximizing values, and we are in a deterministic setup, all policy 
regimes are equivalent and give the same welfare. This is as in Weitzman (1974).      
  Second, when we move to an uncertain world, permits are clearly the worst 
regime. They may help to fix environmental quality at a relatively high level, but only 
at the cost of exposing this quality to exogenous shocks/variability and damaging 
private consumption. Actually, the higher the extrinsic (economic or environmental) 
uncertainty, the worse is the disadvantage of permits relative to taxes and mixed rules. 
This holds for a wide range of parameters, shocks and relative variances of different 
categories of shocks. This happens because permits are a hybrid of price- and 
quantity-based regulations.
7 As a price-based instrument, they are less closely 
connected to the heart of the market failure (pollution externality) than taxes. At the 
                                                            
6 This presupposes that any revenues from pollution taxes or auctioned permits are earmarked for the 
financing of public abatement. This is a conventional notion in the literature. See e.g. Haibara (2009). 
See also Auerbach (2010) who uses the term “dedicated taxes” to describe the case in which sources 
and uses of government funds are related.   
7 As explained by Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, p. 1520), they are price-based because market forces 
determine the price of permits. On the other hand, they are quantity-based because the government sets 
the total amount of permits and emissions. See below for details. 4 
 
same time, as a quantity-based instrument, they provide less controllability than 
numerical rules that command agents to produce or emit at a certain level.  
  Third, in an uncertain world, the verdict of (pollution and output) taxes versus 
mixed rules is open depending on the relative variances of different categories of 
shocks affecting the economy. The main advantage of mixed rules over taxes is that 
they reduce environmental volatility. But this is achieved at the cost of more volatile 
consumption. When extrinsic uncertainty arises from economic sources, the latter 
effect dominates and hence taxes are preferable to rules. However, when 
environmental uncertainty is the dominant source, the former effect dominates and so 
rules are preferable. To further analyze this finding, we examine the first and second 
moments of those endogenous variables that shape social welfare under each policy 
regime and each level of uncertainty. Rules to produce a certain level of output enjoy 
an efficiency advantage when environmental uncertainty is high and so the marginal 
benefits from nature protection are big. By contrast, when environmental uncertainty 
is relatively low, it is better to name a tax and let private agents find the optimal 
quantities themselves; in this case, policies like rules for emissions, which reduce the 
number of choices that private agents can make, hurt the economy. This intuition is 
consistent with Weitzman’s (1974, pp. 485-6) interpretation when he compares price 
vs quantity controls in a static framework.
8 
  Fourth, again in an uncertain world, when the comparison is between pollution 
taxes and output taxes, the latter are better. The attractiveness of output taxes gets 
bigger when environmental uncertainty is high. This result is due to the automatic 
stabilizing role of taxation. In particular, the tax base available to the government 
under output taxes is larger than under pollution taxes. Hence, under non-internalized 
market externalities, macroeconomic volatility is higher under pollution taxes and this 
hurts welfare.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains how 
we differ from the literature. Sections 3, 4 and 5 solve for taxes, permits and rules 
respectively. The first-best is in section 6. The key section is section 7 that compares 
welfare across regimes. Section 8 closes the paper. An appendix includes details.    
 
                                                            
8 Note that “prices” and “quantities” in Weitzman (1974) are closer to pollution taxes and pollution 
permits respectively in our setup. It is, thus, interesting that taxes are always found to be better than 5 
 
2.  How we differ from the literature   
 
Our work is the first attempt to welfare-rank pollution taxes, output taxes, auctioned 
pollution permits and numerical rules for emissions in a unified micro-founded 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, by paying particular attention 
to the source of uncertainty faced. Our work also differs because we allow the 
government to play a mix of roles (to correct for externalities, to raise funds to finance 
public abatement and to shield the economy from shocks) that are important in the 
policy debate. Finally, we look not only at the final welfare effects, but also at the 
various channels through which extrinsic uncertainty shapes welfare and, in 
particular, we look at the first and second moments of endogenous economic and 
environmental variables.  
In his seminal work, Weitzman (1974) compared price- and quantity-based 
regulations showing that uncertainty causes otherwise equivalent policies to produce 
different results. Weitzman focused on the case in which the regulator is uncertain 
about the marginal cost and benefit of pollution and (as Bovenberg and Goulder, 
2002, p. 1530, and Schöb, 1996, point out) worked in a first-best setting, in the sense 
that regulation did not distort private decisions. Since then there has been a rich and 
still expanding literature on the comparison of alternative policy instruments in the 
presence of uncertainty. However, in most of these papers, the approach has been 
static and/or partial equilibrium, and the comparison is between taxes and quotas only 
(see the survey by Bovenberg and Goulders, 2002, section 4.2). An exception is Pizer 
(1999) who used a DSGE model. However, here we use a second-order 
approximation to both the equilibrium solution and the welfare criterion (Pizer used a 
first-order approximation to the equilibrium solution). This is important because it 
allows us to take into account the uncertainty that the agents face when making 
decisions. Also, as shown by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003, 
chapter 6), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) and many others, a second-order 
approximation to the model’s equilibrium solution, as well as to the welfare function, 
helps us to avoid potential spurious welfare rankings of various regimes that may 
arise when the model’s equilibrium solution is approximate to first-order only (see 
                                                                                                                                                                          
permits (at least in the numerical specifications we have used), while the source and magnitude of 
extrinsic uncertainty becomes important to policy ranking only when we compare taxes to rules.   6 
 
section 7 below for further details). Finally, Pizer (1999) compared “rate controls” 
with taxes only and did not allow for public abatement.   
Finally, it is worth stressing that the previous environmental literature has not 
examined the importance of the source of extrinsic uncertainty for the choice of 
efficient policies; as we find, this is crucial. In addition, the literature has not 
considered public abatement together with pollution regulation.
9 Finally, none of the 
previous studies has studied numerical rules for emissions.  
 
3.  A model with taxes  
 
We augment the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model with natural resources 
and environmental policy. The economy is populated by a large number of identical 
infinitely-lived private agents that derive utility from private consumption and the 
stock of environmental quality. Private agents consume, save and produce a single 
good. Output produced generates pollution and this damages environmental quality. 
Since private agents take economy-wide environmental quality as a public good, i.e. 
they do not internalize the effects of their actions on the environment, the 
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. Hence, there is room for government 
intervention. 
In this section, government intervention takes the form of taxes. We focus on 
two types of taxes: first, taxes on output, where output is the polluting activity in our 
model; second, taxes on pollution itself. Whatever the type of taxation, any collected tax 
revenues are used to finance public abatement policy. Since output taxes are the most 
common policy instrument in the related growth literature (see e.g. Xepapadeas, 2004, 
and Economides and Philippopoulos, 2008), we start with them. 
 
Private agents    
For simplicity, the population size is constant and equal to one. The private agent’s 
expected utility is defined over stochastic sequences of private consumption,  t c , and 
the economy’s beginning-of-period environmental quality,  t Q :     
                                                            
9 Schöb (1996), Goulder et al. (1999) and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, section 4.1), among many 
others, have also emphasized the public-finance aspect of environmental policies. But they focus on the 
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where  1 0 < < β  is a time preference rate and  0 E  is an expectations operator based on 
the information available at time zero. 
Without loss of generality, we use for instantaneous utility: 
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where  0, 1 1 μ μ <− <  are the weights given to consumption and environmental 
quality respectively and  1 σ ≥  is a measure of risk aversion. 
The private agent’s within-period budget constraint is: 
 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t t t k k cyA k
α δτ τ + −− +=− =−                                                                (2) 
 
where  tt t yA k
α =  is current output,
10  1 + t k  is the end-of-period capital stock,  t k  is the 
beginning-of-period capital stock,  t A  is a standard index of production technology 
(whose stochastic motion is defined below),  1 0 < <α  and 0 1
k δ ≤ ≤  are usual 
parameters, and  1 0 < ≤ t τ  is the tax rate on (polluting) output.   
The agent chooses  10 {, } tt t ck
∞
+ =  to maximize (1a-b) subject to (2) taking policy 
variables and environmental quality as given. The latter is justified by the open-access 
and public-good features of the environment.   
  
Natural resources   
The stock of environmental quality evolves over time according to:




tt t t QQ Q p g δ δν + =− + −+                                                                                 (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
be used to reduce other taxes. Baldursson et al. (2008) focus on the time-consistency of various 
environmental policy instruments. 
10 We abstract from labor-leisure choices to keep the model simpler. We report that this is not 
important qualitatively. 8 
 
where  0 Q ≥  represents environmental quality without pollution,  t p  is the current 
pollution flow,  t g  is public spending on abatement activities, and 01
q δ ≤≤  and 
0 ν ≥  are parameters measuring respectively the degree of environmental persistence 
and how public spending is translated into actual units of renewable natural resources. 
The flow of pollution,  t p , is modeled as a by-product of output produced,  t y :   
 
tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ==                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where  t φ  is an index of pollution technology or a measure of emissions per unit of 
output.
12  We assume that  t φ  is stochastic (its motion is defined below).          
 
Government budget constraint  
Assuming a balanced budget for the government, we have in each period: 
 
tt tt t t g yA k
α ττ ==                                                                                                          (5) 
 
where  t g  is public spending on abatement policy.   
 
Exogenous stochastic variables 
We assume that the two technologies,  t A  and  t φ , follow  (1) AR  stochastic processes 
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φ ε ε  are Gaussian i.i.d. shocks with zero means and known variances, 
2
a σ  and 
2
φ σ . 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11 The motion of natural resources in (3) is as in Jouvet et al. (2005); see p. 1599 in their paper for 
further details. The inclusion of the parameter  0 Q ≥  is helpful when we solve the model numerically. 
12 One could assume that pollution technology has also an endogenous component depending on e.g. 
private and public investment in pollution-reducing technology. 9 
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given output taxes) 
The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) of the above economy is 
summarized by the following equations at  0 t ≥  (see Appendix A.1 for details):  
 
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
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where 
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.  This is a three-equation system in 
11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
++ = . This DCE is for given policy (where the latter is summarized by 
output tax rates  0 {} tt τ
∞
=  levied by the government), initial conditions for the stock 
variables,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables,  t A  and 
t φ . Section 7 will choose the output tax rate.   
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given pollution taxes) 
When there are taxes on pollution itself rather than on polluting activities like output, 
the DCE is summarized by the following equations at  0 t ≥  (see Appendix A.3 for 
details):  
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We thus have a new three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ += . This DCE is for given 
policy (where the latter is summarized by pollution tax rates  0 {} tt θ
∞
=  levied by the 10 
 
government), initial conditions,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic processes,  t A  and  t φ . 
Section 7 will choose the pollution tax rate.
13    
 
4.  The same model with permits  
 
Now the government creates a market for pollution by issuing a number of permits that 
matches its maximum target amount of pollution. In order to pollute legally, a private 
agent has to hold a number of permits equal to its own quantity of pollution. In turn, the 
government uses the collected revenues to finance public abatement policy. The model 
in this section is similar to that used by Jouvet et al. (2005).
14   
In particular, we assume that, at each time t, the government issues a quantity 
of pollution permits,  t P , and auctions them at a price,  t q . These permits are bought in 
the current period but can be used by the polluting private agent/firm in the next time 
period,  1 t + .




tt t t t t t t kk c q p y A k
α δ ++ −− ++ = =                                                                        (9) 
 
where  11 11 1 1 tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ++ ++ + + == .   
  The government budget constraint changes from equation (5) to:  
    




                                                              
13 The special case in which the government uses taxes to internalize externalities only (Pigouvian 
case) is in Appendix A.2.   
14 Jouvet et al. (2005) focus on whether permits should be given away rather than sold by the government. 
15 In this model specification, we cannot assume that permits are bought and used in the same current 
period. This is because current-period pollution is given (see Appendix B.4, where the right-hand side 
of equation (B.5d) consists of exogenous and predetermined variables only, implying that  t P  cannot be 
a policy control variable). This applies to the transition path; by contrast, it is not a problem in the long 
run (see Appendix B.4 for details). Allowing, for instance, for endogenous labor could allow permits to 
be bought and used within the same period but it would complicate the model unnecessarily. As we 
report below when we study the long run, even quantitative results are affected very little by this timing 
assumption. In any case, it is worth noting that our assumed timing (namely, that permits are bought 
today but are used in the next period) is close to the recent Obama climate-change bill, where the 11 
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given the quantity of pollution permits) 
The DCE of the above economy is summarized by the following equations at  0 t ≥  
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We thus have a four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
+ += . This new DCE is for 
given policy - where the latter is summarized by the quantity of pollution permits 
0 {} tt P
∞
=  issued by the government - initial conditions,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic 
processes,  t A  and  t φ . Section 7 will choose the quantity of pollution permits.
17 
 
5.  The same model with numerical rules for emissions   
 
We next study the case in which the government specifies the speed to a long-term 
pollution target. By speed, we mean that pollution tomorrow will be a fraction of 
pollution today, where this fraction is part of environmental policy. This approach can 
be captured by a policy rule like: 
 
t t t t p p p γ γ + − = + ) 1 ( 1                                                                                                 (12) 
 
where  p  is long-run pollution and 0 1 t γ < ≤  is an autoregressive “parameter”.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
government issues a fixed number of permits to emit carbon dioxide each year, which firms must buy 
before releasing their stuff into the atmosphere (see e.g. The Economist, July 4, 2009, p. 37).  
16 Equation (11d) is a market-clearing condition which states that, in equilibrium, agents’ demand for 
pollution equals supply with the latter determined by the government. See also Jouvet et al. (2005). 
17 The special case in which the government uses permits to internalize externalities only is in 
Appendix B.2. Appendix B.3 shows the case in which the government sets the price of permits 
allowing their quantity to be market determined.   12 
 
  Assuming that emission rules are binding all the time, and since 
tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ == , the motion of pollution in (12) also determines the motion of 
capital,  10 {} tt k
∞
+= ; in turn, private consumption follows residually from the private 
agent’s budget constraint.
18 Note that now, under pure rules, there are neither public 
revenues nor public cleanup,  0 ttt gq τ = ==  (see below for further details).   
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given pollution rules) 
The DCE of the above economy can be summarized by the following equations at any 
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We thus have a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ += . This new DCE is for given 
policy - where the latter is summarized by the long-run pollution target,  p , and the 
autoregressive “parameter”  0 {} tt γ
∞
=  in (12) - initial conditions,  0 k  and  0 Q , and 
stochastic processes,  t A  and  t φ . Section 7 will choose the values of policy 
instruments. Note that the value of   t γ  is irrelevant in the long run when variables do 
not change.   
 
6.  Social planner solution (benchmark case)    
 
We finally present the social planner’s solution. This is the first-best serving as a 
benchmark. The planner chooses allocations  11 0 {, , , } tt t tt cgk Q
∞
+ +=  directly to maximize 
(1a-b) subject to resource constraints only. The solution is (see Appendix D for 
details): 
 
                                                              
18 See also the discussion in Stokey (1998, p. 18). The property that, in this policy regime, the private 
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0 t ξ >  is a dynamic multiplier associated with (14c). We thus have a five-equation 
system in  11 0 {, , , ,} tt t t t t cgk Q ξ
∞
++ = . This is given initial conditions for the stock 
variables,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables,  t A  and 
t φ . We report that, in all numerical solutions below, this first-best solution will always 
be welfare superior to the second-best regimes studied in sections 3-5 (this will hold 
for any feasible values of the distorting policy instruments).    
 
7.  Evaluation of second-best policies   
 
This section evaluates the alternative second-best policy regimes developed in 
sections 3-5 above. In our context, when choosing its distorting policy instruments in 
the least damaging way, the government aims at the following:
19 First, to correct for 
pollution externalities (Pigouvian policy). Second, to create revenues to finance public 
abatement (and, in richer contexts, to reduce other taxes). Third, since there is also 
uncertainty, the risk-averse government aims to reduce volatility. Optimal policy will 
reflect all these tasks.          
We start by explaining how we work and by presenting parameter values used 
in the numerical solutions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and-control policies reduce the number of choices that private agents can make.  14 
 
How we work   
Since the DCE solution and the resulting welfare, under each policy regime, depend 
on the values of the second-best policy instruments employed, we will compare the 
maximum welfare across regimes, namely, the welfare resulting from the welfare-
maximizing values of the policy instruments in each regime. Welfare is defined as the 
conditional expectation of the discounted sum of household’s lifetime utility. We 
focus on flat policy instruments, namely, policy instruments that remain constant over 
time (see also e.g. Stokey and Rebelo, 1995, and Ortigueira, 1998). In all cases 
reported, there is a tradeoff in policy and hence a well-defined welfare-maximizing 
value of policy instruments.  
To solve the system of non-linear expected difference equations that form the 
DCE in each regime, we approximate both the DCE solution and the welfare criterion 
to second-order around the associated non-stochastic steady state solution. We then 
compute welfare for a wide range of values of the flat policy instrument in each 
regime and thus find the welfare maximizing-value of the policy instrument and the 
associated maximum welfare under that regime.
20  
In particular, the second-order approximation to welfare follows from 
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where, for any variable  t x ,  ˆ ln( / ) ( )/ tt t x xx x xx ≡ ≅−  and x is the long-run value of 
t x . Also,  1 (1 ) ( , ) au c Q μ σ ≡− ,  2 (1 )(1 ) ( , ) au c Q μ σ ≡ −− , 
22
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5 (1 )(1 ) ( , ) au c Q μμ σ ≡− − . The values of  ˆt c  and  ˆ
t Q  
follow from the second-order approximation of the DCE solution as said above.    
                                                                                                                                                                              
19 See also Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, p. 1514). 
20 To solve and simulate the second-order approximation of the DCE solution under each regime, we 
use the Matlab functions made available by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Note that in the cases of 
output taxes, pollution taxes and pollution permits, there is obviously a single policy instrument as 
defined in (7a-c), (8a-c) and (11a-d) respectively. In the case of rules in (13a-c), the long-run pollution 
target,  p, will be set so as to reproduce the long-run welfare under the other regimes so that only γ  is 
chosen optimally in the dynamic, stochastic system (see below for further details). See Schmitt-Grohé 15 
 
Finally, we need a measure of comparison of welfare gains/losses associated 
with alternative regimes. This measure, denoted as  ij ζ  in what follows, is obtained by 
computing the percentage compensation in private consumption that the private agent 
would require in each time-period under regime  j  so as to be equally well off 
between regimes i and  j i ≠  (see the notes in Table 3 for the value of  ij ζ ). This is a 
popular measure in dynamic general equilibrium models (see e.g. Lucas, 1990).  
 
Parameter values   
We keep all parameter values the same across different regimes, so that the evaluation 
of different policies is not blurred by parameter differences. Whenever parameter 
values are important for the results obtained, we will explicitly discuss their effects 
and robustness. As said above, the policy instrument in each regime is chosen to 
maximize welfare. The parameter values used are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
The values of the economic parameters are rather standard. In particular, the 
baseline values used for the rate of time preference (β ), the depreciation rate of 
capital (
k δ ), the capital share in output (α ), the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution ( σ / 1 ), the constant term ( A) and the persistence parameter ( a ρ ) of the 
TFP process, are as in most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium calibration and 
estimation studies. As discussed earlier, we will experiment with different values of 
the standard deviation of the TFP process ( a σ ). 
There is, of course, much less empirical evidence and consensus on the value 
of environmental parameters. For our baseline results, we set μ  (i.e. the weight given 
to private consumption vis-à-vis environmental quality in the utility function) at a 
relatively low level, 0.6, and discuss other results later on. Regarding the parameters 
characterizing the exogenous process for environmental technology, we choose a high 
persistence parameter,  933 . 0 = = α φ ρ ρ , and normalize its constant term, φ , at 0.5. 
Finally, we set v (i.e. how public abatement spending is translated into actual units of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and Uribe (2005) and Kollmann (2008) on how this type of optimally computed policy differs from 
optimal policy in the Ramsey sense.   16 
 
environmental quality) at 5; this parameter value helps us to match the units in the 
environmental quality equation (3) and hence obtain a well-defined trade-off in 
second-best policy. Since v is the same across regimes with public abatement 
spending (taxes and permits), its value does not matter for the comparison of these 
two regimes. Nevertheless, it can matter when we compare these two regimes to the 
command-and-control regime which does not allow for public abatement spending 
(we discuss this issue below). 
  We are now ready to present numerical results. Before investigating the 
relatively general case in which exogenous shocks cause fluctuations around steady 
state, we study the deterministic steady state. This will help us to understand the 
working of the model and how results change when uncertainty is introduced. We will 
report results for some key variables as well as for the associated welfare. 
 
Evaluation of regimes at steady state (certainty)  
We first present results when the economy remains at its non-stochastic steady state. 
Steady-state results for consumption, c, environmental quality, Q, output,  y , as well 
as the resulting welfare, defined as 
*(, ) uc Q , under each regime, are reported in Table 
2 (policy instruments are set at their welfare-maximizing values).    
 
Table 2 around here 
 
  The second column in Table 2 presents long-run results for the model in 
equations (7a-c), where the government sets output taxes and uses the collected tax 
revenues to finance its abatement policy. In the third column, the policy instrument is 
pollution taxes (see the model in equations (8a-c)). The fourth column presents results 
for the model is equations (11a-d), where the government sets the quantity of 
pollution permits and finances its abatement policy from the sale of those permits. In 
the fifth column, we present results for the model in equations (13a-c), where the 
government uses numerical rules; in contrast to previous regimes, now there are no 
revenues and hence no abatement policy on the side of the government. The very last 
column reports the social planner solution in equations (14a-e); this gives the best 
outcome as expected (from now on, we do not study this first-best case).    17 
 
  Output taxes, pollution taxes and pollution permits (see second, third and 
fourth column in Table 2) are equivalent.
21 On the other hand, rules (see fifth column) 
clearly differ from taxes and permits. In particular, using our baseline parameter 
values, Kyoto-like rules appear to be much worse than both taxes and permits. In 
general, however, this welfare comparison is ambiguous depending on parameter 
values.
22 This finding arises simply because pure rules are not really comparable to 
the other two regimes: in our setting, by assumption, such rules do not generate public 
revenues and hence do not allow for public abatement policy (or, more generally, 
given tax bases, they allow for less public abatement policy than revenue-raising 
regimes like taxes and permits). Thus, to get a meaningful comparison of different 
regimes when we introduce uncertainty below, we have to make them equivalent in a 
deterministic setup. We therefore add public abatement policy financed by, say, an 
output tax into the regime of pure Kyoto-like rules (see Appendix C.3 for details). 
Specifically, we choose the long-run pollution target and the long-run output tax rate 
so as to reproduce the same long-run solutions for consumption and environmental 
quality, and thus the same long-run welfare, as in the other second-best regimes. 
Results are reported in the sixth, second from the end, column in Table 2. In what 
follows, instead of pure rules, we will work with this mixed regime – Kyoto-like rules 
combined (in the long run only) with public abatement financed by taxes – and 
compare this regime to taxes and permits. All policy regimes are now equivalent in a 
deterministic setup (see also Table 3 below); this respects Weitzman (1974).   
  To summarize, there are two policy messages. First, public abatement 
activities constitute an important part of environmental policy. Policies that yield no 
revenues, and hence do not allow for public abatement, suffer a disadvantage relative 
                                                              
21 In the results for the deterministic steady state in Table 2, any second, or higher, decimal point 
differences are due to numerical solution approximations of the welfare-maximizing value of policy 
instruments. In addition, in the case of permits, any differences from the other regimes are due to the 
assumed timing, namely, permits are bought in the current period but are used in the next period (see 
also footnote 15 and Appendix B.4). In any case, these differences are quantitatively very small and do 
not affect our conclusions.   
22 Specifically, our comparative static exercises imply that rules are welfare inferior to taxes and 
permits in the long run, when  0 ν ≥  (which measures how public spending on cleanup is translated into 
actual units of nature) is relatively high and/or 01 μ < <  (which is the weight given to private 
consumption vis-à-vis environmental quality) is relatively low. Intuitively, when public abatement 
policy, being financed by tax or permit revenues, is effective in preserving the environment (i.e. when 
ν  is high) and/or we value little the distorting effects of taxes and permits on private consumption (i.e. 
when  μ  is low), numerical rules are inferior to taxes and permits. As ν  gets smaller and/or μ  gets 
larger, this inferiority diminishes. For very low values of ν  and/or very high values of μ , numerical 
rules can turn out to be welfare superior to taxes and permits. 18 
 
to revenue-yielding policies. This of course presupposes that any revenues from 
pollution taxes or permits are earmarked for the financing of public abatement. In this 
literature, the key role of public finance has already been pointed out, although the 
emphasis has been on the revenue recycling effect (see e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 
2002, section 4.1). In our model, without being combined with public abatement 
policy, pure Kyoto-like rules are not really comparable to taxes and permits and, at 
least for a wide range of parameter values used, such rules are inferior to taxes and 
permits, especially in terms of environmental quality. Second, to the extent that policy 
instruments are chosen optimally, and there is no uncertainty, the choice of the 
second-best policy instrument is irrelevant to social welfare. Of course, this can apply 
to regimes that are comparable (in our case, all of them allow for abatement policy). 
  
Evaluation of regimes under uncertainty 
We now allow for uncertainty coming from the exogenous stochastic autoregressive 
processes for production and pollution technologies in equations (6a-b). We suppose 
that the economy is initially at its steady state studied above and, starting from  0 t = , 
there are shocks to  t A  and  t φ .   
  Working as explained above and using the same baseline parameter values, we 
compute discounted expected lifetime utility under each regime for a varying degree 
of uncertainty as summarized by the standard deviations of production and pollution 
technologies,  a σ  and  φ σ . Results are reported in Table 3. For expositional reasons, 
we study: (i) the deterministic case ( 0 a φ σ σ = = ); (ii) when there is only one source 
of uncertainty ( 01 . 0 = α σ  and  0 = φ σ ; 0 = α σ  and  01 . 0 = φ σ ); (iii) a case of 
relatively low uncertainty in both stochastic variables ( 0.01 αφ σ σ = = ); (iv) two 
scenarios representing high levels of uncertainty in one of the two stochastic variables 
(0 1 . 0 = α σ  and  0.05 φ σ = ; and  0.05 α σ = , 01 . 0 = φ σ ); (v) a scenario with relatively 
high uncertainty in both stochastic variables ( 0.05 a φ σ σ = = ). 
 
Table 3 around here 
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  Table 3 confirms that, in a deterministic environment ( 0 a φ σ σ == ), all 
regimes imply the same welfare. By contrast, in a stochastic setup where  ,0 a φ σ σ > , 
the choice of the policy instrument does matter. Table 3 also reports the welfare 
gain/loss (i.e. the value of ij ζ ) when we choose regime i instead of regime  j i ≠ . A 
positive value of  ij ζ  means that i is superior to  j . For instance, if  0 ij x ζ =>, an 
agent, who happens to be in  j , will require a permanent consumption subsidy of  % x  
to become indifferent between  j  and i.  
  Welfare differences between output taxes and pollution taxes are summarized 
by the values of  12 ζ  in Table 3. Output taxes are more attractive and this 
attractiveness gets bigger when environmental uncertainty is relatively high. For 
instance, when  0.05 φ σ =  and  0.01 α σ = , a welfare gain of 2.16%, in terms of private 
consumption, can be obtained if we use output, instead of pollution, taxes. As we will 
see in the next subsection, this has to do with the automatic stabilizing role of 
taxation. The tax base available to the government under output taxes is larger than 
under pollution taxes. Hence macroeconomic volatility is higher under pollution taxes 
and this is bad for welfare. It is not surprising that the case for output taxes becomes 
stronger when environmental uncertainty is high. The reason is that, only under some 
market imperfection, larger governments can moderate the effects of external shocks. 
In our model, economic shocks are internalized by private agents themselves. By 
contrast, environmental shocks are not internalized since environmental quality is 
treated as a public good. This is why a large government size can play its automatic 
stabilizing role when environmental uncertainty is high. This result is consistent with 
the macroeconomic literature, where a mix of rigidities is needed to produce the 
negative correlation between government size and output volatility (see e.g. Andrés et 
al., 2008). 
  Welfare differences between output taxes and permits are summarized by the 
values of  13 ζ , while welfare differences between pollution taxes and permits are 
summarized by the values of  23 ζ , in Table 3. Both types of taxes are always superior 
to permits. For instance, when  0.01 αφ σ σ = = , a welfare gain of 3.04% is obtained if 
we use output taxes instead of permits. The superiority of taxes further increases with 
the degree of uncertainty. For instance, when  0.05 αφ σ σ = = , the gain, from using 20 
 
output taxes instead of permits, rises to 7.38%. Notice that taxes are superior even 
when environmental uncertainty is higher than economic uncertainty. Also notice that 
these are substantial welfare gains relatively to those found, for instance, in the 
literature on the welfare implications of tax reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, who 
compares Ramsey to suboptimal tax structures).    
  We next compare taxes to mixed rules. Welfare differences between output 
taxes and mixed rules, and between pollution taxes and mixed rules, are summarized 
respectively by the values of  14 ζ  and  24 ζ  in the last two columns of Table 3. When 
economic uncertainty ( a σ ) is higher than, or equal to, environmental uncertainty 
( φ σ ), taxes are better than mixed rules. For low levels of uncertainty, such welfare 
differences are small, but the higher  a σ  and  φ σ  become, the higher the superiority of 
taxes over rules, as long as  a φ σ σ ≥ . For instance, when  0.05 a σ =  and  0.01 φ σ = , the 
gain from using output (resp. pollution) taxes is 4.69% (resp. 4.61%), while when 
0.05 a φ σ σ == , the gain is 3.23% (resp. 1.48%). On the other hand, when 
environmental uncertainty is higher than economic uncertainty ( a φ σ σ < ), rules are 
better than taxes, especially than pollution taxes. For instance, when  0.01 a σ =  and 
0.05 φ σ = , the welfare gain from switching from output taxes to mixed rules is 
2.10%, while the gain from switching from pollution taxes to mixed rules is 4.26%. 
Pollution taxes perform worse than output taxes because their automatic stabilizing 
effect is smaller, as discussed above.     
  To summarize, as shown by Weitzman (1974), ex ante uncertainty affects the 
choice of the policy instrument. Taxes and mixed rules are substantially better than 
permits; this holds over the whole range of parameter values, the sources of 
uncertainty, and the size of variances of shocks, that we have experimented with. 
Welfare benefits from the use of taxes, instead of permits, can be high for high levels 
of uncertainty irrespectively of where this uncertainty comes from. Comparing output 
to pollution taxes, the former are better. However, differences between output and 
pollution taxes are small relatively to differences between taxes and permits and 
between taxes and rules. On the other hand, the comparison between taxes and mixed 
rules depends on the relative variances of different categories of shocks. Taxes are 
better than rules when economic uncertainty is no smaller than environmental 21 
 
uncertainty. But, when environmental uncertainty is the dominant source of 
uncertainty, mixed rules are superior to taxes, especially to pollution taxes that allow 
for a relatively small automatic stabilizing effect.  
  The intuition behind these welfare results will be discussed in the next 
subsection that presents means, variances and covariances of the arguments in the 
welfare criterion.  
  Before we move on, we report that we get well-defined values for the welfare-
maximizing policy instrument in each regime (although we realize that numerical 
solutions should be treated with caution, these values are within the expected range). 
Results are in Table 3. For instance, when  0.01 αφ σ σ = = , the optimal output tax rate 
is found to be 0.33, the optimal pollution tax rate is 0.66, the optimal quantity of 
permits is 0.62 and the optimal degree of pollution persistence under mixed rules is 
0.94. Notice that, in general, the values of the policy instruments are not 
monotonically increasing in the degree of uncertainty. The reason is that policy 
intervention comes at a cost, and also, as explained above, stabilization is only one of 
the goals of policy.  
 
Looking behind welfare under uncertainty  
To understand what is driving the above welfare differences under uncertainty, we 
study the first and second moments of the two arguments in the utility function, 
namely, private consumption,  t c , and the stock of environmental quality,  t Q . Note 
from the second-order approximation to the welfare function (15) that, in addition to 
the steady state values of  t c  and  t Q  and their deviations from these steady state 
values, what also matters for welfare is the squared deviations and cross-products of 
t c  and  t Q  from their steady state values. Given that the steady state solution values 
are the same across policy regimes, any welfare differences in the stochastic setup are 
driven by differences in expected means, variances and covariances of the series for 
t c and  t Q  (see Appendix E for details).  
  Tables 4a-d present the expected means, standard deviations and correlations 
of  t c and  t Q  for all four regimes under various levels of uncertainty. Welfare 
increases when the means of  t c and  t Q  increase, their variances decrease and their 
correlation decreases. 22 
 
Tables 4a-d around here 
 
  As can be seen in Tables 4a-d, different policy regimes imply different trade-
offs in outcomes whose net, total effect on welfare was summarized in Table 3 above. 
Some regimes are good for consumption, while others are good for environmental 
quality.  
  In particular, output and emission taxes (see Tables 4a-b) and mixed rules (see 
Table 4d) imply higher expected consumption than permits (see Table 4c), while 
permits are superior in terms of expected environmental quality, especially when 
uncertainty is high. On the other hand, the variance of environmental quality is higher 
under permits than under taxes and rules. The higher volatility in environmental 
quality, in combination with lower expected consumption, makes permits the worst 
regime in all experiments studied. On the other hand, a weak point of taxes is the high 
correlation between consumption and environmental quality (by contrast, correlation 
is negative in all cases under permits and in most cases under rules, and this is good 
for welfare).  
  The comparison of the two better regimes, taxes and mixed rules in Tables 4a-
b and 4c respectively, implies that the main advantages of mixed rules are that they 
reduce environmental variation and also allow consumption deviations to move 
counter-cyclically with deviations in environmental quality. For this to be achieved, 
however, all the adjustment from an exogenously caused stochasticity has to be 
absorbed by consumption. In particular, consumption volatility is higher under rules 
than under taxes. When economic uncertainty is no smaller than environmental 
uncertainty, as was summarized in Table 3, it is the adverse consumption volatility 
effects that dominate so that welfare is higher under taxes.
23 But when environmental 
uncertainty is the dominant source of uncertainty, the benefits from lower variation in 
environmental quality and the inverse correlation between environment and 
consumption become important enough to make rules superior to taxes (this happens, 
for instance, when  0.01 a σ =  and  0.05 φ σ =  in Tables 3 and 4).  
  To summarize, in an uncertain world, permits are the worst regime. They can 
fix expected environmental quality at a relatively high level, but only at the cost of 
                                                              
23 This is despite a relatively low value for the weight given to consumption versus environmental 
quality in the utility function in our calibration (see Table 1). Hence, if anything, our calibration does 
not do any favours to the tax regime. 23 
 
exposing this expected quality to high volatility and damaging expected private 
consumption. The higher the extrinsic uncertainty, the higher is the disadvantage of 
permits relative to taxes and mixed rules. This holds for a wide range of parameters, 
shocks and relative variances of different categories of shocks. Auctioned permits are 
inferior because (as pointed out by Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, p. 1520) they are a 
hybrid of price- and quantity-based regulations. They are price-based because market 
forces determine the price of permits. They are quantity-based because the 
government sets the total amount of permits and hence emissions. The problem is 
that, as a price-based instrument, they are less closely connected to the heart of the 
problem (pollution externality) than taxes. At the same time, as a quantity-based 
instrument, they provide less controllability than numerical emission rules that 
command agents to produce or emit a certain level. This argument is also supported 
by the result that when the government uses the price of permits, instead of their 
quantity, as a policy instrument (see Appendix B.3), permits and taxes become very 
similar on and off steady state (results are available upon request). 
  The comparison between taxes and mixed rules is open depending on the 
relative variances of different categories of shocks affecting the economy. When 
uncertainty arises from economic factors, taxes are preferable. But when 
environmental uncertainty becomes the dominant source, mixed rules are preferable. 
We believe this is consistent with Weitzman’s (1974, pp. 485-6) intuition. As 
Weitzman has shown in a first-best setting, quantities are better than prices, as 
planning instruments, when the benefit function is more curved and/or the cost 
function is more linear. In our model, this seems to be the case under Kyoto-like rules 
in the presence of high uncertainty over the environment. In such a situation, better 
environmental quality gives a direct welfare benefit to private agents; hence, when 
environmental uncertainty is relatively high, the marginal benefits of an extra unit of 
natural resources change rapidly and thus the curvature of the benefit function is high. 
By contrast, when environmental uncertainty is relatively low, the benefit function is 
closer to being linear. In such a situation, prices are a better instrument; the marginal 
benefit is almost linear in some range so that it is better to name a price and let private 
agents find the optimal quantities themselves. In this case, policies like rules, that 




8.  Concluding remarks and possible extensions  
 
We evaluated output taxes, pollution taxes, auctioned pollution permits and Kyoto-
like emission rules, in a unified micro-founded dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model. We focused on the role of uncertainty and showed the importance 
of public finance and abatement. The latter is an important ingredient of any 
environmental policy. Permits, despite their popularity among politicians, are the 
worst regime. When we compare taxes and rules, taxes are better when economic 
volatility is the main source of uncertainty. On the other hand, when environmental 
shocks are the dominant source of extrinsic uncertainty, rules perform better. Between 
taxes, output taxes are better than pollution taxes as a consequence of the small tax 
base available to governments taxing only pollution.    
  We are aware that many issues have not been studied. For instance, it would 
be interesting to search for the best international agreement in our setup and, in 
particular, the design of international carbon market and international public funding. 
It is also important to evaluate environmental policies under structural uncertainty 
resulting from model misspecification of the environmental/pollution process. We 





Table 1: Baseline parameter values 
 
Parameter Description  Value 
α   Capital share in production  0.33 
k δ   capital depreciation rate  0.1 
σ   curvature parameter in utility function  2 
β   Time discount factor  0.97 
μ   Consumption weight in utility function  0.6 
Q  environmental quality without pollution  1 
q δ   persistence of environmental quality  0.9 
A  long-run total factor productivity  1 
a ρ   persistence of total factor productivity  0.933 
φ   long-run pollution technology  0.5 
φ ρ   Persistence of pollution technology  0.933 
ν   transformation of spending into units of nature  5 
 
 





































































Notes: (i) Mixed rules: pure rules plus (in the long run only) abatement financed by an output tax. (ii) 
* (1 )
(, ) (, )
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, where  300 t =  and  0
300 = β . We work with discounted welfare to make it 
comparable to the results in Tables 3-4 below, where simulations are run for 300 years. This is also 
consistent with equation (15).  26 
 




Notes: (i) The fourth regime (mixed rules) includes tax-financed abatement policy at steady state so that it is equivalent to the other regimes in a deterministic setup. (ii) The value of 









≅ , where 
i
t V  and 
j
t V  denote the discounted sums of second-order approximations to welfare in equation (14) and averaged over 1000 
simulations. (iii) To evaluate the expectation in the welfare calculations, we use numerical integration with 1000 simulations. As said, we use 300 years in our evaluation of life-time 
welfare since, because of discounting, there is practically a zero weight attached to later outcomes.   
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24 ζ  
(%) 
0 0  0.3319 -  14.30 
 
0.6638 -  14.30 
 
0.6425 -  14.36 
 
- -  14.30  0  0.31  0.31  0  0 
0 0.01  0.3321  -  14.30 
 
0.6617 -  14.32 
 
0.6361 -  14.53 
 
0.931  -14.29  0.10  1.14  1.04  - 0.07  - 0.17 
0.01 0  0.3318  -  14.44 
 
0.6637 -  14.44 
 
0.6224 -  14.95 
 
0.941  -14.49  0  2.48 2.48 0.26 0.26 
0.01 0.01  0.3320  -  14.45 
 
0.6639 -  14.47 
 
0.6196 -  15.06 
 
0.937  -14.48  0.10 3.04 2.94 0.18 0.08 
0.01 0.05  0.3318  -  14.38 
 
0.6530 -  14.82 
 
0.5808 -  16.28 
 
0.920  -13.97  2.16  8.96  6.80  - 2.10  - 4.26 
0.05 0.01  0.3290  -  18.07 
 




-  19.82  0.941  -  19.28  0.08 6.69 6.61 4.69 4.61 
0.05 0.05  0.3289  -  18.00 
 
0.6491 -  18.44 
 
0.5241 -  19.94 
 
0.932  -  18.82  1.75 7.38 5.63 3.23 1.48 27 
 
Table 4a: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under output taxes 
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Table 4b: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under pollution taxes 
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Table 4c: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under permits 
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Table 4d: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under mixed rules 
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Appendix A: DCE with taxes 
1. The first-order conditions of the individual’s problem include the budget constraint 
in (2) and the Euler equation (7b). Then, using (4)-(5) into (3), we get (7c). All this 
gives (7a-c) which is a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  in terms of  0 {} tt τ
∞
= . 
The long-run DCE follows if we simply drop time subscripts.   
 
2. A policy of Pigouvian taxes can follow as a special case. Suppose that any revenues 
from pollution taxes are returned to the individual in the form of lump-sum transfers, 
t S . The budget constraint of the individual is: 
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t t kk c A k S
α δτ + −− +=− +                                                                      (A.1) 
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt t t SA k
α τ =                                                                                                                (A.2) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t kk c A k
















=− + − ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
                                                       (A.3b)         
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t QQ Q A k
α δδ φ + =− + −                                                                              (A.3c)                             
Equations (A.3a)-(A.3c) are a new three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  given 
0 {} tt τ
∞
= . The long-run DCE follows if we simply drop time subscripts.   
 
3. In the case of pollution taxes,  t θ , and since pollution is  tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ == , the 
budget constraint of the individual changes from (2) to: 
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t t kk cA k
α δφ θ + −− +=−                                                                         (A.4) 
so that the Euler condition in (8b) follows.  
The government budget constraint in (5) becomes: 
tt t tt t t t g yA k
α θφ θφ ==                                             (A.5) 
so that (8c) follows.  
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Appendix B: DCE with permits  
1. The first-order conditions of the individual’s problem include the budget constraint 
in (9) and the Euler equation (11b). Then, using (10) for  t g  and  1 tt t t t p Ak P
α φ − ==  into 
(3), we get (11c), while (11d) was explained in the text. All this gives (11a-d) which is 
a four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
+ +=  in terms of  0 {} tt P
∞
= . The long-run follows 
if we simply drop time subscripts. 
 
2. A policy of “Pigouvian permits” can follow as a special case. Suppose that any 
revenues from the same of pollution permits are returned to the individual in the form 
of lump-sum transfers,  t S . That is, the budget constraint of the agent is: 
11 (1 )
k
tt t t t t t t kk c q p A k S
α δ ++ −− ++ = +                                                                    (B.1) 
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
1 tt t Sq p + = = tt qP                                                                                                                            (B.2) 










+ −− +=                                                                                        (B.3a)                               
11 1
11 1 1 1
1
(1 [ ]) [ (1 )]
k tt
tt t t t t t t
tt
uu
qE A k E A k
cc
αα αφ β δ α
−− +





                                 (B.3b)                               
11 (1 )
qq
tt t QQ Q P δδ +− =− + −                                                                                   (B.3c)                               
11 1 1 [] tt t t t t t P Ep E A k
α φ ++ + + ==                                                                                     (B.3d)                               
Equations (B.3a)-(B.3d) are a four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
+ +=  given 
0 {} tt P
∞
= . The long-run DCE follows if we drop time subscripts.   
 
3. When the instrument is the price of permits, rather than their quantity, the DCE is:     
11 1 1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t t t t kk c q A k A k
α α δφ ++ + + −− ++ =                                                                (B.4a)  
11 1
11 1 1 1
1
(1 [ ]) [ (1 )]
k tt
tt t t t t t t
tt
uu
qE A k E A k
cc
αα αφ β δ α
−− +





                                 (B.4b)                  
11 1 1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t t t t QQ Q A k q A k
α α δδ φ ν φ ++ + + =− + − +                                                      (B.4c) 
Equations (B.4a)-(B.4c) are a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  given  0 {} tt q
∞
= . 
The long-run DCE follows if we drop time subscripts.  
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4. We model the case in which the firm buys and uses permits within the same period. 
The DCE changes from (11a-d) to:  
1 (1 )
k t
tt t t t
t
P
kk c q P δ
φ




[( 1 ( 1 ) ) ]
k tt












                                                    (B.5b)      
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t QQ Q P q P δδ ν + =− + −+                                                                          (B.5c) 
tt t t t P pA k
α φ ==                                                                                                       (B.5d) 
Notice that in (B.5d), given exogenous shocks and the predetermined value of capital, 
t P  has to follow residually. This is different from (11d) with the other timing 
assumed. Also, notice that, in contrast to the transition path, (B.5a-d) can give a long-
run solution. Namely, given policy, (B.5d) gives k , and then (B.5a-c) give  , , cQq.    
 
Appendix C: DCE with rules  
1. Using (4) into (12), we get (13b) which gives the motion of private capital. All this 
gives (13-c) which constitute a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  in terms of  
p  and  0 {} tt γ
∞



















                                                                                                     (C.1b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  (recall that, in the long-run,  p  is a 
policy instrument and that, in all periods,  tt t t pA k
α φ = ). 
 
2. We now add public abatement financed by lump-sum taxes,  t S . That is, the budget 
constraint of the individual is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k S
α δ + −− += −                                                                                (C.2)                  
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt GS =                                                                                                                       (C.3) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c G A k
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+
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k                                                                              (C.4b) 
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t QQ Q A k G
α δ δφ ν + =− + − +                                                                     (C.4c) 





















                                                                                                     (C.5b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  and G . 
 
3. We now add public abatement financed by output taxes,  t τ . The budget constraint 
of the individual is:  
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k
α δτ + −− +=−                                                                              (C.6)                   
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt t t GA k
α τ =                                                                                                                (C.7) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k
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k                                                                              (C.8b)                         
1 (1 ) ( )
qq
tt t t t t QQ QA k
α δδφ ν τ + =− + − −                                                                   (C.8c)                     

























                                                                                                (C.9b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  and τ . We choose the values of  p  
and τ  so as to hit the long-run solution of the previous regimes.   
 
Appendix D: Social planner’s solution   
The planner chooses  11 0 {, , , } tt t tt cgk Q
∞





tt t t t t kk c g A k
α δ + −− ++ =                                                                               (D.1a)                               
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t QQ Q A k g
α δ δφ ν + =− + − +                                                                     (D.1b) 












































                                                                                                                (D.2c) 
where  0 > ξ  is a dynamic multiplier associated with (D.1b),                            
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(D.1b) and (D.2a)-(D.2c) constitute a five-equation system in { }
∞
= + + 0 1 1 , , , , t t t t t t g Q k c ξ . 
The long-run follows if we drop time subscripts.   
  
Appendix E: Statistical moments  
To see that examining the means, variances and covariances of the variables in levels 
is equivalent to examining the same moments for the variables defined as deviations 
from their (common) steady state, note the following. For the random variables  x and 
y , define  x x x − = ˆ  and  y y y − = ˆ , where x  (resp.  y ) is the average value of  x 
(resp.  y ). The relationship between the mean of x and the mean of x ˆ is given by:  
x x E x E − = ) ( ) ˆ (                                                                                                        (E.1) 
(E.1) implies that, when x  is the same across regimes, any differences in the mean of 
x are due to differences in the mean of x ˆ . The relationship between 
2 ˆ x  and the 
variance of x ˆ  is given by:  
2 2 2 )] ˆ ( [ ) ˆ ( )] ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ˆ var( x E x E x E x E x − = − =                                                                  (E.2)  
Hence, given the mean of x ˆ , any differences in the average value of 
2 ˆ x  are captured 
by differences in the variance of  x ˆ . Further, the variances of  x and x ˆ  are the same, 
i.e.  ) var( )] ) ( ( ) [( )] ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ˆ var(
2 2 x x x E x x E x E x E x = − − − = − = . Finally, given their 
means, any differences in the cross-products of x ˆ  and  y ˆ  are captured by their 
covariance, i.e.  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ˆ [ ) ˆ , ˆ cov( y E x E y x E y x − = , where: 
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